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Many low income countries in Africa are optimistic that producing biofuels 
domestically will not only reduce their dependence on imported fossil fuels, but also 
stimulate economic development, particularly in poorer rural areas. Skeptics, on the 
other hand, view biofuels as a threat to food security in the region and as a land-
grabbing opportunity for foreign investors. As a result of this ongoing debate, national 
biofuels task forces have been asked to evaluate both the viability of domestic biofuels 
production and its broader implications for economic development. To guide these 
complex evaluations, this paper presents an analytical framework that prioritizes …./ 
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different aspects of a comprehensive national assessment and identifies suitable 
evaluation methods. The findings from recent assessments for Mozambique and 
Tanzania are used to illustrate the framework. While these two country studies found 
that biofuels investments could enhance development, their experiences highlight 
potential tradeoffs, especially at the macroeconomic and environmental levels, where 
further research is needed. 
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1 Introduction 
The recent spike in fossil fuel prices and concomitant increase in global demand for 
biofuels has prompted many developing countries to consider establishing domestic 
biofuels industries. Many governments in developing regions like Africa view biofuels 
as an opportunity to reduce dependence on imported fuels. At the same time, they also 
hope that biofuels will stimulate economic growth, create jobs and improve rural 
incomes. It is in rural areas where most of Africa’s poor populations reside and where 
their livelihoods depend heavily on agriculture. Biofuels are expected to provide a new 
market and income opportunity for these farmers (see FAO 2008). A number of African 
governments have responded by establishing task forces to assess their countries’ 
potential to competitively produce biofuels, to interact with foreign investors and to 
help draft biofuels policies.  
Optimism over biofuels is, however, matched by skepticism. Some development 
specialists worry that biofuels are a potentially grave mistake. First and foremost, they 
view biofuels as a potential threat to food security. Given limited land resources and 
low farm productivity in developing countries, biofuels could displace food crop 
production and reduce already inadequate food supplies. Biofuels are also viewed by 
skeptics as a ‘land grabbing’ opportunity for foreign speculators. The threat of higher oil 
prices could prompt governments to sign long term leases for large amounts of (often 
state-owned) land. Once the leases are signed, speculators may employ inappropriately 
capital-intensive production techniques or simply use their position to curry further 
political favour with local elites. In the end, biofuels may never even be produced. The 
‘food versus fuel’ debate and the danger of ‘land grabbing’ have captured the attention 
of the development community and local and international media. As a result, national 
task forces have not only been asked to look at issues of private sector competitiveness 
and market access, but also at broader development concerns, such as food security and 
poverty.  
Evaluating the long term development implications of producing biofuels is both 
complex and technically challenging. In this paper, we present an ‘analytical 
framework’ to guide researchers in their national biofuels assessments. Key 
considerations are discussed at the firm/farm, macroeconomic and household levels. To 
illustrate these, we draw on the findings from two recent studies for Mozambique and 
Tanzania (Arndt et al. 2010a, 2010b). We discuss suitable analytical methods for 
evaluating the socioeconomic impacts of biofuels expansion within these countries and, 
finally, consider some implications for the environment. The rest of the paper proceeds 
as follows: in the next section we review the state of the biofuels sector in our two case 
study countries, and present the analytical framework in the subsequent section. A final 
section summarizes our findings and observations and provides suggestions for future 
research. 
2  Biofuels in Mozambique and Tanzania 
Mozambique and Tanzania have much in common with other low income African 
countries. As shown in Table 1, a majority of their populations are smallholder farmers 
living in rural areas, where they rely on rainfed agriculture and are subject to frequent 
weather shocks and food shortages. The main food crops are maize and cassava, which    2
Table 1: Key statistics for Mozambique and Tanzania 
 Mozambique  Tanzania 
Population (millions)  22.4  42.5 
Rural share (%)  63.2  74.5 
GDP per capita (US$)  439.9  496.4 
Poverty rate (US$1.25 per day)  74.7  88.5 
Share of total GDP (%)  100.0  100.0 
Agriculture 25.9  31.8 
Food crops  18.2  19.1 
Export crops  1.1  3.2 
Other agriculture  6.7  9.6 
Industry 23.2  23.1 
Services 50.9  45.1 
Agriculture’s share of exports (%)  22.0  47.9 
Crops 5.4  33.1 
Other 16.6  14.9 
Total land area (millions hectares)  78.6  88.6 
Arable land   48.8  34.2 
Currently cultivated land  4.5  9.0 
Notes:  Poverty rates are for 2003 and 2000 for Mozambique and Tanzania, respectively, and show the 
share of the population with expenditure below the poverty line. Agriculture’s export share is of 
total goods exports (excluding services). 
Source:   World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). GDP and export shares from Arndt et al. 
(2010a, 2010b).  
are grown using traditional inputs and rudimentary technologies. Production is mainly 
for subsistence, especially since market access is constrained by inadequate road 
networks. Ensuring household food security therefore features prominently in these 
countries’ national strategies. Smallholder’s access to foreign markets is particularly 
limited, with most export crops either grown on large estates/plantations (e.g., tea and 
sugarcane) or via outgrower schemes (e.g., cotton and coffee). Average per capita 
incomes are low and poverty is high in both countries, reflecting their common 
challenge of generating pro-poor growth, particularly in rural areas.  
Favourable agro-climatic conditions are a prerequisite for a domestic biofuels industry. 
Mozambique and Tanzania are both well-suited to growing a range of feedstock crops, 
including sugarcane and cassava for ethanol and oilseeds for biodiesel. Moreover, only 
a small share of arable land is currently cultivated. Mozambique, for example, uses less 
than 10 per cent of its potential agricultural land. The country also has untapped water 
resources for irrigation, and deep-water ports that provide good access to both Asian 
and South African markets. However, despite these conditions, Mozambique has a far 
smaller export crop sector than Tanzania. Almost half of Tanzania’s export earnings 
come from agriculture, compared to only a fifth for Mozambique. Moreover, two thirds 
of Tanzania’s agricultural exports are from crops, whereas ocean fisheries dominate in 
Mozambique. Thus while both countries are well-endowed with natural resources, 
Tanzania has taken greater advantage of its export crop potential.   3
Both countries have received considerable interest from foreign investors wanting to 
establish biofuels processing facilities and feedstock production. Investors are 
particularly interested in Mozambique. By 2009 the country’s government had received 
requests for 12 million hectares of state-owned land to produce feedstock, of which two 
million hectares of requests were considered credible (Arndt et al. 2010a). By contrast, 
the interest in Tanzania has been more modest. The country’s five largest biofuels 
investors submitted requests to the government for almost 400,000 hectares, of which 
only about 75,000 hectares were granted (Cleaver et al. 2010). Since all land in African 
countries like Mozambique and Tanzania is state-owned, it is the government that 
decides which requests are granted. 
To some extent, investors’ differing levels of interest in the two countries reflect the 
status of their biofuels policies. Mozambique’s government established a task force in 
2006, which drafted biofuels policy and had it passed by parliament by early 2009. By 
contrast, Tanzania’s task force, which was established in 2005, had only completed a set 
of ‘biofuels guidelines’ by early 2010 as a forerunner to fully fledged legislation. 
Without formal legislation, producers in Tanzania can only produce for export markets, 
despite high transport costs in reaching foreign markets and considerable domestic 
demand for alternative fuels.  
Mozambique and Tanzania therefore provide good case studies for examining the 
potential impacts of biofuels investments in Africa. Both countries have favourable 
conditions for growing feedstocks and their governments have identified biofuels as a 
potential growth sector for rural farmers. However, they also have concerns over the 
implications for national food security and poverty, which has prompted the broad 
mandates of their respective biofuels task forces. The two countries differ in the role 
that export crops currently play in their economies, the amount of foreign interest they 
have received and their progress towards enacting biofuels policy.  
3  Evaluating the suitability and economic implications of biofuels 
We present an analytical framework that can guide national task forces as they evaluate 
the economic implications of proposed biofuels investments. Various elements of this 
framework, which are shown in Table 2, have been used in the Mozambique and 
Tanzania case studies. The framework lists seven key areas of concern for policymakers 
separated into four levels of analysis (i.e., farm/firm, macroeconomic, household and 
environment). At the first level, we consider the main factors influencing the private 
sector’s decision to produce biofuels, such as competiveness and world prices. At the 
second level we explore the implications that biofuels may have for the broader 
economy, including its effects on resource constraints and fiscal and external balances. 
Third, we consider how biofuels may ultimately influence household incomes and 
welfare, focusing on poorer households. Analysis at each level is sequential (i.e., 
builds upon each other) and can be done using a range of methods, although the 
most appropriate methods generally become more complex as one moves down the 
list of considerations. However, as will be seen, the importance of conducting more 
complex analyses increases with the scale of biofuels proposals. Larger investments 
are more likely to have economywide implications, and so their evaluation requires    4
Table 2: Framework for evaluating biofuels investments 
Level of analysis    Consideration 
Farm or firm  (1)   Production costs and international competitiveness 
  (2)   Profitability and world price volatility 
Macroeconomic  (3)   Taxes, public investments and fiscal balances 
  (4)   Growth linkages, employment and resource 
constraints 
  (5)  Exports, exchange rates and external balances 
Household  (6)   Income, poverty and food security  
Environment  (7)  Greenhouse gas emissions and water use 
more comprehensive and sophisticated methods. Finally, we consider the environmental 
implications of expanded biofuels production. Here, relatively little is known and the 
area is principally flagged as an important topic for future research. 
3.1  Production costs and international competitiveness 
The first consideration that requires detailed evaluation is whether or not biofuels can be 
profitably produced by the private sector within a country or subnational region. 
Production costs depend on a range of factors, such as workers’ wages, farm 
productivity, biofuels processing technologies and local energy and transport prices. 
Production costs will vary according to the type of feedstock used to produce biofuels. 
For example, transport costs may be higher for heavier feedstocks, such as sugarcane 
and cassava, compared to lighter oilseeds like jatropha. Similarly, processing plants that 
use more advanced technologies may achieve higher biofuels yields than less efficient 
facilities, implying that less feedstock and farm labour is needed per litre of biofuels 
produced. Larger and more efficient processing facilities may, however, incur higher 
transport costs than smaller facilities situated closer to feedstock farmers. Overall, the 
suitability of different feedstocks and the availability of and capacity to run more 
advanced processing technologies varies across countries, thus making it difficult to 
draw on production cost estimates from other countries.  
Another important factor influencing production costs is the type of institutional 
arrangement used to produce feedstocks. Many foreign investors, particularly those 
wanting to grow traditional field crops like sugarcane, prefer to adopt a plantation 
approach to feedstock production. Under this arrangement, rural households supply 
labourers to large scale estate farms in return for wages. The estates then supply 
feedstock to biofuels processing facilitates (possibly onsite). An alternative to a 
plantation approach is an ‘outgrower scheme’, under which smallholder farmers are 
subcontracted by large wholesalers or biofuels processors to produce feedstock using 
their own land and labour. Inputs, such as fertilizer, may be provided by the contractor, 
and crops are then purchased from smallholder farmers at agreed upon prices.1 
                                                 
1  Input provision via some form of vertical integration has the potential to overcome market failures 
with respect to information and contract enforcement that pervade rural areas of many developing 
countries. Because many biofuels feedstocks, such as sugarcane and jatropha, have limited value 
unless locally processed, an exchange involving inputs now in exchange for a fixed price transaction 
of cash for feedstock at a later date has the potential to occur.    5
Successful outgrower schemes operate in many parts of Africa and involve a wide range 
of export crops, such as coffee in Southern Uganda and cotton in Eastern Zambia.  
Production costs are heavily influenced by the choice of production arrangement. 
Outgrower schemes are typically less mechanized and more labour-intensive than 
plantation approaches, and therefore they tend to generate more jobs for rural 
households, albeit at lower wages. For this reason, governments often prefer outgrower 
arrangements. However, there are a number of constraints to these schemes. First, they 
are often less efficient than plantations, especially from a production per hectare 
perspective. In other words, smallholders may obtain lower yields and thus require 
larger amounts of land and labour (but usually less capital) to produce the same amount 
of feedstock. Second, outgrower schemes may prove less reliable in supplying feedstock 
to processing facilities, which often prefer to operate continuously in order to reduce 
costs. A compromise between government and investor interests is a ‘mixed approach’, 
whereby governments agree to investors producing an initial amount of feedstock on 
large estates, after which any additional feedstock is produced via smallholder 
outgrower schemes. This ensures minimum feedstock supplies for biofuels processing 
while also engaging smallholders in part of the production process (Evans 2010). 
Analyses of biofuels production costs under different feedstocks and institutional 
arrangements have been conducted for Mozambique and Tanzania. These assessments 
can be separated into two parts: feedstock production and biofuels processing. 
Feedstock cost estimates are typically conducted by national agricultural ministries as 
part of their research and extension systems. For example, Tanzania has detailed farm 
budget surveys, which itemize the cost and physical quantity of different farm inputs, 
such as seeds, fertilizer and labour for land clearing, weeding and harvesting. These 
surveys were compiled for different crops grown by smallholders using traditional and 
advanced technologies. Similar surveys have been conducted for large scale sugarcane 
estates. With this information it is possible to estimate the production technologies (i.e., 
input requirements and costs) for alternative feedstock.  
Estimating biofuels processing costs involves an accounting exercise tailored to the 
local context and biofuels investment. Econergy (2008) and Felix et al. (2010) 
conducted such studies for Mozambique and Tanzania, respectively. Technology 
capacity assessments initially determined the two countries’ ability to adopt different 
processing technologies. For example, a lack of skilled engineers, biochemists and 
technicians in Tanzania meant that it could not adopt the most advanced technologies, 
even though these are more cost efficient than other options. Once the appropriate 
processing technology was identified it was necessary to cost the required inputs, such 
as labour and feedstock. Table 3 presents the final estimated ethanol production costs 
for Tanzania using cassava and sugarcane feedstock grown on either large scale estates 
or via smallholder outgrower schemes.   6
Table 3: Ethanol production costs in Tanzania  
 Sugarcane  Cassava 









technology   
Production inputs per 100,000 litres         
Biofuels production (litres)  100,000  100,000  100,000  100,000 
Feedstock inputs (mt)  1,441  1,441  546  546 
Feedstock yield (litres/mt)  69.4  69.4  183.3  183.3 
Land  yield  (mt/ha)  84.0 42.8 10.0 20.0 
Land employed (ha)  17.2  33.7  54.6  27.3 
Farm workers employed (people)  7.2  75.8  117.7  18.2 
Processing workers employed (people)  0.6  0.8  0.3  0.3 
Average production cost per 100 litres 
(US$) 
43.4 56.7 46.9 42.4 
Labour and land  8.4  10.6  15.5  13.4 
Capital 10.2  9.6  8.4  6.4 
Fuels, fertilizers and electricity  8.7  6.8  8.6  11.0 
Trade and transport services  9.5  18.1  10.0  7.3 
Other inputs  6.6  11.6  4.4  4.3 
Feedstock share of total production cost 
(%) 
61.0 64.3 48.3 42.8 
Note:  Reported technology options are for feedstock production and not biofuels processing facilities. 
Source:  Own calculations using data from Arndt et al. (2010b). 
Since the same biofuels processing technology is used in the table for both small and 
large scale ethanol production, there is no difference in the amount of sugarcane 
feedstock required to produce biofuels (see columns 1 and 2). However, smallholders 
require much more land because their yields are half those of large scale estates (i.e., 43 
versus 84 tons per hectare). Sugarcane outgrower schemes also employ ten times more 
workers than estates per litre of biofuels produced. Overall, it is feedstock that accounts 
for the largest share of production costs. Since smallholders are less efficient at 
producing feedstock, and due to the large distances between their farms and processers 
(which raises transport costs), the total production cost under outgrower schemes is 
substantially higher than that of estates in Tanzania (i.e., US$0.57 versus US$0.43 per 
litre). The key role of farm productivity is evident in the two outgrower cassava 
scenarios, which compare current and more advanced feedstock technologies (see 
columns 3 and 4). The cost of producing biofuels declines significantly under more 
advanced farming practices (i.e., from US$0.47 to US$0.42 per litre).  
 
   7
Figure 1: Comparison of Tanzanian and Brazilian ethanol prices (2009)  
 
Notes:  Tanzanian ethanol prices include sales of coproducts. Reported technology options are for 
biofuels processing facilities and not feedstock production.  
Source:   Own calculations using data from Felix et al. (2010). 
Figure 1 compares the final production costs from Tanzania with those in other 
countries, under different biofuels processing technologies.2 It shows that only certain 
biofuels investments in Tanzania could export ethanol competitively vis-à-vis other 
major ethanol producing countries like Brazil. Indeed, under the ‘medium’ processing 
technology, which was deemed appropriate for Tanzania, only cassava grown via 
outgrower schemes and sugarcane grown on large estates can be exported to Europe at a 
competitive price. Moreover, Tanzania’s competitiveness depends crucially on its 
exemption from European Union (EU) import tariffs (i.e., under the ‘everything-but-
arms’ trade agreement). Mozambique was also found to be competitive in EU markets, 
since it is able to supply ethanol from sugarcane estates at US$0.30–US$0.38 per litre 
(Econergy 2008).  
Having information on biofuels production costs and international competiveness is 
crucial for national biofuels task forces as they evaluate foreign investors’ biofuels 
proposals. Conducting cost accounting exercises for different biofuels production 
options is thus afforded the highest priority in our analytical framework, and should be a 
central component of any national biofuels assessment. 
3.2  Profitability and world price volatility  
Even if domestic biofuels producers are competitive against other countries, it is does 
not necessarily follow that they will be profitable relative to fossil fuels. For example, 
ethanol produced in Mozambique and Tanzania and sold domestically can compete 
against imported fossil fuels only when the crude oil price at their borders is greater 
than US$60 and US$66 per barrel, respectively (Econergy 2008; Felix et al. 2010). Oil 
prices surged to historical highs in mid-2008. With the financial crisis, prices fell back  
                                                 
2  The price estimates for Tanzania and Brazil shown in Figure 1 are drawn from Felix et al. (2010).    8
Figure 2: Historical and projected world crude oil prices 
 
Notes:  Historical data is average annual free-on-board crude oil import cost to the United States. 
Projected data is the weighted average crude oil import price delivered to United States refiners.  
Source:   USEIA (2010a, 2010b). 
 
Figure 3: Ethanol production costs in Mozambique under different oil prices and cost shares 
 
Note:  The price of biofuels production inputs associated with oil increase in direct proportion to oil 
prices.  
Source:   Own calculations using ethanol production costs from Mozambique (Econergy 2008; Arndt 
2010a). 
throughout the second half of 2008 and into 2009. Despite the slow recovery from 
recession in the developed world, oil prices have remained above, usually well above, 
the break even thresholds for Mozambique and Tanzania. World oil prices are currently 
above US$75 per barrel and futures prices rise continuously to about US$90 per barrel   9
in 2018. Nevertheless, it is possible that long run prices might not remain above the cost 
competitive level. Figure 2 shows historical and projected oil prices from the United 
States Energy Information Agency’s 2010 Energy Outlook (USEIA 2010a, 2010b). If 
the ‘low price’ projection is realized, then it is unlikely that either country can produce 
biofuels profitably in the future. However, under both the ‘reference price’ and ‘high 
price’ scenarios, biofuels are highly competitive against fossil fuels.  
Identifying oil price thresholds beyond which biofuels become profitable is an 
important part of any preliminary evaluation of proposed biofuels investments. To 
identify these thresholds it is important to account for the relationship between biofuels 
production costs and world oil prices. For example, Table 3 shows that transport is a 
major component of production costs in Tanzania. Since transport prices depend on 
gasoline prices, we would expect them to increase under high oil price scenarios, thus 
driving up biofuels prices alongside oil prices. This is shown in Figure 3, which reports 
ethanol production costs in Mozambique under different world oil prices, assuming 
different oil shares in total production costs.  
The solid lines in the figure show biofuels production costs while the dotted line shows 
the break even point (i.e., where oil and biofuels prices are equal). The US$60 per barrel 
profitability threshold for Mozambican ethanol producers is marked in the figure. About 
30–40 per cent of production costs in Mozambique are due to oil inputs (e.g., transport 
and fertilizer). Since only part of biofuels costs are linked to fossil fuels, these costs 
increase at a slower rate than oil prices.3 Thus, biofuels should remain profitable at all 
oil prices above the threshold, although profit rates will be smaller if oil is a large share 
of total production costs (see ‘60 per cent oil share’ share). Conversely, if world market 
fluctuations push oil prices below threshold levels, then profitability erodes slower 
when oil is a large share of total costs.  
In summary, identifying threshold oil prices and the share of oil in production costs is 
another key consideration when evaluating the suitability of biofuels as a long term 
investment, and the vulnerability of biofuels profitability to fluctuations in world oil 
prices. The first two considerations in our analytical framework, dealing with farm/firm-
level competiveness and profitability, are thus essential components of any evaluation 
exercise. If a particular biofuels investment proposal fails on either criterion, then no 
subsequent analysis is necessary. However, even if long run oil prices are expected to 
remain above the threshold point, short term fluctuations could still make biofuels 
temporarily unprofitable.  
3.3  Taxes, public investments and fiscal constraints 
Because of risks (such as the world price risks mentioned above) and the strategic 
importance of fuels, foreign investors may petition governments to provide financial 
support to new biofuels industries. In Mozambique, for example, investors have asked 
the government to build new infrastructure, including port facilities and roads to 
connect feedstock producers and biofuels processors. In Mozambique and Tanzania, 
                                                 
3  The figure assumes that the cost of oil-related inputs into biofuels production expand in proportion to 
oil prices, while the other non-oil-related input costs remain unchanged. This stylized relationship 
does not account for price changes for other inputs, such as labour wages, during periods of high and 
low oil prices, which would affect the cost of non-oil-related inputs (see Arndt et al. 2008).    10
investors have asked for lower taxes on biofuels vis-à-vis imported fossil fuels in order 
to encourage domestic sales and offset the cost of initial capital outlays. Finally, as 
mentioned above, biofuels producers may also request subsidies during downswings in 
world oil prices in order to ensure profitability.  
Governments of low income countries that are dependent on imported fuels, such as 
Tanzania and Mozambique, have real reasons to consider these petitions. Fuels and 
derived products (such as plastics and chemicals) can account for up to 20 per cent of 
total imports. Offsetting world oil price increases with subsidies can be hugely 
expensive for the public purse and worsen the macroeconomic adjustment necessary to 
generate the foreign exchange to finance oil imports (see, for example, Arndt et al. 
2008). At the same time, allowing prices to pass through to domestic markets can have 
serious social consequences. Massive riots erupted in Maputo (the principal city of 
Mozambique) in early 2008 following the imposition of higher public transport tariffs 
(which stemmed from higher prices for fuel).  
Nevertheless, support to biofuels does not come without costs. Maintaining fiscal 
balance means that expenditures and tax reductions to support biofuels must be offset 
by reduced spending and higher taxes elsewhere in the economy. This fiscal constraint 
is obviously most binding when the investments and tax incentives requested by 
biofuels producers are large enough to hinder the development of other sectors. In such 
cases, it is essential that opportunity costs of public support be considered when 
evaluating proposed biofuels investments. 
The Mozambique and Tanzania studies did not consider the opportunity costs of 
providing tax incentives to biofuels producers. However, the preferential treatment of 
biofuels has been a contentious part of negotiations with foreign investors and between 
finance ministries and national biofuels task forces. This is because taxes comprise a 
large part of retail gasoline and diesel prices. For example, taxes made up half of 
gasoline retail prices and a third of diesel prices in Mozambique during 2004 (IMF 
2005a). Nationally, petroleum taxes generated 10.7 and 15.8 per cent of total 
government tax revenues in Mozambique and Tanzania, respectively (see Table 4). 
Reducing taxes on biofuels relative to those on imported petroleum and diesel could, 
therefore, have significant fiscal implications. For example, replacing 10 per cent of 
imported fossil fuels with tax-free biofuels, which is the current technological limit for 
blending ethanol, would reduce tax revenues by 1.1 and 1.6 per cent in Mozambique 
and Tanzania, respectively. To make up this shortfall, these countries would, for 
example, need to increase direct taxes by 5 and 6 per cent, respectively, or reduce 
spending on agriculture by 13 and 19 per cent, respectively. Large adjustments such as 
these would have economywide implications, such as for non-biofuels enterprises or for 
agricultural growth in rural areas.  
Rather than allowing biofuels to go completely untaxed, it may be preferable to provide 
producer supports or incentives that vary with world oil price levels. As shown in 
Figure 3, biofuels profitability expands when oil prices are high and declines (or even 
reverses) when prices are low. Therefore, subsidies during downswings could be 
financed by taxes during upswings. The point at which subsidies become taxes depends 
on the threshold price. Moreover, tax and subsidy rates could also vary with oil prices. 
The size of tax/subsidies would depend on the link between oil prices and profits, which 
in turn depends on the share of oil in total production costs. A variable incentive scheme    11
Table 4: Tax revenues and public spending in Mozambique and Tanzania (2004) 
  Millions of US$  Share of total (%) 
  Mozambique Tanzania Mozambique Tanzania 
Total tax revenues  668  1,512  100.0  100.0 
Petroleum taxes  71  239  10.7  15.8 
Import duties  98  148  14.6  9.8 
Direct taxes  152  411  22.7  27.2 
Other taxes (e.g., VAT)  348  713  52.0  47.2 
Total priority spending   820  1,276  100.0  100.0 
Agriculture  56 126 6.9 9.9 
Education 268  510  32.7  40.0 
Health 147  266  17.9  20.9 
Infrastructure 177  260  21.6  20.3 
Other areas or sectors  171  114  20.8  8.9 
Source:   IMF (2005a, 2005b). 
for biofuels producers should therefore build on the firm/farm-level analysis described 
in previous sections.  
Another advantage of variable tax/subsidies schemes is that they could be tailored to 
favour particular production technologies, such as small scale outgrower schemes, 
which might otherwise remain unprofitable but whose social benefits may be desirable. 
However, estimating the social benefits of alternative production scenarios requires the 
more complex analysis described below.  
3.4  Growth linkages, employment and resource constraints 
Expanding biofuels production can have implications beyond the biofuels feedstock and 
downstream processing sectors. This is because biofuels production may generate 
‘growth linkages’ (i.e., spillover effects) to the rest of the economy. For example, as 
mentioned earlier, producing biofuels requires intermediate inputs, such as transport 
services to get biofuels to consumers or export markets. In this case, expanding biofuels 
generates additional demand for locally produced services, which may create jobs and 
income opportunities for workers and households linked to the biofuels supply chain. 
Moreover, these new incomes will eventually be spent on consumer goods and services, 
which again generate additional demand for non-biofuels products. In this way, biofuels 
could trigger a cycle of intersectoral growth linkages known as a ‘multiplier’ process. 
Both the Mozambique and Tanzania studies used computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models to estimate the economic growth effects of expanding biofuels 
production (see Arndt et al. 2010a, 2010b). This type of economywide model captures 
the sectoral linkage effects of expanding biofuels production by drawing directly on the 
production cost and input information described in earlier sections. The two studies 
found that biofuels investments should significantly increase the pace of economic 
growth over the coming decade. For example, Table 5 shows that the simulated biofuels 
investments increased the annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
Mozambique and Tanzania by between 0.2 and 0.4 percentage points depending on the   12
adopted feedstock and farming arrangement. Growth rate effects are larger in 
Mozambique relative to the size of simulated investments because Mozambique is a 
much smaller economy than Tanzania (see Table 1). Apart from sectoral growth 
linkages, faster economic growth is also a result of expanding the two countries’ 
productive capacity (i.e., attracting new foreign direct investment and bringing new 
agricultural lands under cultivation).  
While there are economywide gains from expanding biofuels production, there are also 
constraints that may reduce production and incomes elsewhere in the economy. For 
example, biofuels production requires factor inputs, such as land and labour, which may 
be in limited supply in some countries. So allocating land to biofuels feedstock may 
reduce the land available for other crops. Indeed, potential competition over crop land 
has received considerable attention in the biofuels debate, mainly because of concerns 
over the possible displacement of food crop production. However, even if uncultivated, 
arable land is available to produce biofuels, there may still be a displacement of labour 
from non-biofuels sectors, as workers are drawn into feedstock estates/plantations or as 
smallholder farmers reallocate their time towards producing feedstock crops. Both land 
and labour supply constraints mean that, as biofuels production expands, it may cause 
production in non-biofuels sectors to fall, thus offsetting at least some of the 
economywide gains mentioned above.  
Economywide resource constraints were considered in Mozambique and Tanzania (see 
Arndt et al. 2010a, 2010b). Both studies assumed that half of biofuels feedstock 
production will occur on previously uncultivated lands, given these countries’ large 
amounts of unused arable lands. The remaining lands are expected to come from areas 
Table 5: Growth effects and resource constraints in Mozambique and Tanzania 













Biofuels produced (mil. litres)  198  210  1000  1000 
Change in annual GDP growth rate 
(percentage point) 
0.23 0.32 0.35 0.25 
Change in cultivated crop land (1000ha)  275  140  86  168 
Biofuels  feedstock  550 280 172 337 
Food crops  -183  -73  65  23 
Traditional export crops  -92  -67  -150  -191 
Change in employment (1000s)  0  0  0  0 
Biofuels  jobs  326  130 73 759 
Other agricultural sectors  165  59  -76  -95 
Other non-agricultural sectors  -491  -189  3  -664 
Exchange rate appreciation (%)  9.5  6.3  6.1  7.0 
Change in cereals price index (%)  3.3  1.7  -2.4  -2.4 
Source:   Adapted from Arndt et al. (2010a, 2010b).   13
currently being used to grow other crops. For example, Table 5 shows that half of the 
550,000 hectares of land used to produce biodiesel from jatropha in Mozambique is 
supplied by an increase in the total amount of cultivated crop land. The remaining lands 
come from either displacing food crops (i.e., 183,000 hectares) or traditional export 
crops (i.e., 92,000 hectares). Similarly, producing 198 million litres of biodiesel per year 
using jatropha and smallholder outgrower schemes creates jobs for 130,000 workers. 
However, with labour already in short supply, especially during harvest season, these 
biofuels workers must leave other jobs, causing production in these sectors to decline. 
Resource constraints were found to be most severe for smallholder outgrower schemes, 
given their higher labour-intensity and lower farm productivity. Indeed, the very low 
crop yields of sugarcane farmers in Mozambique explain the larger labour displacement 
here than in Tanzania.  
The CGE modelling approach adopted by our two case studies is a fairly complex 
method of estimating economywide growth effects. A simpler approach is to integrate 
the production cost information compiled in earlier sections into an input-output table or 
social accounting matrix. This can then be used to conduct multiplier analysis (see 
Breisinger et al. 2009). However, a major limitation of multiplier analysis is that it 
assumes there are no resource constraints. In a multiplier model, any additional land and 
labour needed to produce biofuels can be supplied without affecting the resources 
available in other sectors. Multiplier models therefore tend to overstate the benefits and 
underestimate the tradeoffs of producing biofuels. These tradeoffs may be particularly 
important when evaluating large biofuels investments and when land use change and 
food security are major policy concerns. In such cases CGE modelling is the preferred 
method of analysis. 
3.5  Exports, exchange rates and external balances 
Another advantage of CGE models is that they provide a consistent accounting 
framework for jointly evaluating macro- and microeconomic outcomes. This is 
important because there are macroeconomic linkages through which biofuels may affect 
economic growth. For example, biofuels can relieve foreign exchange constraints, 
which often limit developing countries’ ability to import the investment goods needed to 
expand production in other sectors. Biofuels may also have implications for a country’s 
balance of payments and foreign exchange rate. For example, if biofuels exports expand 
rapidly (or fossil fuel imports decline) then this can induce an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (i.e., by increasing the demand for local currency or reducing demand for 
foreign currency). This appreciation lowers the competitiveness of other non-biofuels 
exporters (i.e., by making their goods more expensive for foreigners). Expanding 
biofuels production therefore has implications for other sectors in the economy, not just 
via heightened resource competition, but also through its long run effect on a country’s 
external balance and exchange rate.  
The importance of considering external balances was shown in Table 5, where the real 
exchange rates of both Mozambique and Tanzania appreciated significantly under 
expanded biofuels production. This appreciation caused the production of non-biofuels 
exports in the CGE model to decline significantly, as evidenced by the fall in the 
amount of land allocated to traditional export crops. This reduced the amount of 
displaced food crop land in Mozambique, thereby alleviating some food security 
concerns. In fact, in Tanzania, where large amounts of land are currently allocated to 
traditional export crops, the reduction in non-biofuels exports following the real   14
appreciation actually leads to more lands allocated to food crops and a small increase in 
domestic food production. Thus, in Tanzania the primary concern of the national 
biofuels task force should be less about long run food security, and more about the fiscal 
implications and adjustment costs associated with shifting out of traditional export crops 
and into a new biofuels industry. So if, for example, the public sector costs of replacing 
existing export crops with a new biofuels industry exceed its economic benefits, then 
the biofuels proposal should be declined. However, a proposal with negative net 
benefits may still be desirable if it provides a way of raising rural incomes and reducing 
poverty. 
3.6  Incomes, poverty and food security  
Our analytical framework also considers the impact of biofuels investments on 
household incomes and poverty. Households may benefit directly from biofuels 
production if they are involved in the biofuels production process, either as feedstock 
farmers or as employees in processing facilities. In such cases, workers who leave jobs 
in other sectors to take up employment in the biofuels sector will be better off if they are 
paid higher wages. However, the indirect benefits of biofuels production may prove as, 
if not more, important as direct benefits. For example, workers outside of the biofuels 
sector may benefit from higher average wages caused by increased demand for labour in 
the biofuels sectors. Similarly, as mentioned above, faster economic growth may 
generate new income and employment opportunities for workers throughout the 
economy. Finally, the appreciated exchange rate may reduce the price of imported 
goods, thus benefiting consumers with more import-intensive consumption patterns. 
Each of these impact channels should increase income for certain sections of the 
population. 
However, not all households will benefit from expanding biofuels production. In the 
previous section, we identified farmers growing traditional export crops as being 
particularly vulnerable to shifts in the real exchange rate. These workers will find their 
incomes declining alongside their export competiveness and they will eventually have 
to search for employment in other sectors, possibly in the new biofuels sectors. 
However, while medium run growth and employment are expected to improve, in the 
short run there may be lags in the process of switching jobs from one industry to 
another, especially if new job opportunities are in a different geographic location. 
During this adjustment period, we would expect at least temporary reductions in some 
households’ incomes and food security. Therefore, the net impact of biofuels production 
on household incomes and poverty will depend on the type of labour demanded by 
biofuels producers (i.e., skilled or unskilled), the wages that are paid to biofuels workers 
relative to existing wages, the effect on consumer prices and households’ consumption 
patterns. 
The Mozambique and Tanzania studies both conducted microsimulation analysis using 
nationally representative surveys of household incomes and expenditures. The predicted 
changes in consumption and prices from the CGE model were passed down to the 
survey, where standard poverty measures were calculated. Table 6 reports the change in 
the poverty ‘headcount rate’, which is the share of population living below the official 
poverty line. In both countries it was found that the net effect of biofuels expansion was 
a reduction in the national poverty rate. Moreover, poor households in both rural and 
urban areas benefited from faster economic growth, higher wages and lower consumer 
prices. Poverty declines the most, especially in rural areas, when feedstock is produced   15
using outgrower schemes rather than on plantations – even after controlling for the type 
of feedstock used. However, the choice of feedstock significantly influences the welfare 
gains for lower income households. For example, it was found the jatropha or cassava 
benefited rural households in the bottom income quintile due to their lower skilled and 
higher labour intensities. By contrast, even when sugarcane-based ethanol was produced 
using outgrower schemes it was higher income households that benefited the most. 
Measuring the impact of biofuels production on household incomes and poverty is 
particularly complex. ‘Partial equilibrium’ studies, which only measure direct impacts, 
will not capture the full economic implications of biofuels for household welfare. They 
exclude changes in average wages and consumer prices, both of which determine 
incomes for households that are not employed in the biofuels sectors. These indirect 
effects may be substantial for large biofuels investments, such as those being proposed 
for Mozambique. In such cases it is essential that economywide methods, such as CGE 
modelling, are used to evaluate welfare effects. For smaller investments it is possible 
that partial equilibrium sector level studies may suffice, such as those that calculate the 
number of new jobs and the wages in the biofuels sector, or the crop prices and farm 
revenues that will be earned by participating farmers or workers.  
3.7 Environmental  implications 
Much of the research community working on the environmental implications of biofuels 
– especially in relation to the renewable fuel policies of the EU and US – are concerned 
about the land use changes that might be induced by the expansion of biofuels feedstock 
crops, and what that implies for the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Land use change 
may be catalyzed by both the direct and indirect (market response mediated) land use 
effects of biofuels expansion. The key regions of concern are the corn and soybean 
growing regions of the US, the vast crop livestock agricultural complex of Brazil, and 
the sensitive areas of South East Asia which grow palm oil (mostly at the expense of 
forested area). The most recent estimates of net GHG emissions from biofuels derived 
from corn when land use change is accounted for are about 84–91 per cent of emissions 
from gasoline (Tyner et al. 2010).  
While the agricultural growth potential of Central and Southern Africa is substantial, 
these regions do not figure strongly into net GHG emissions calculations, due to the 
small level of biofuels feedstock production currently taking place there. The European 
Commission commissioned a comprehensive study (Edwards et al. 2010) to look at the 
GHG emissions arising from the simulated biofuels impacts of various global models, 
which showed rather small impacts coming from Africa, relative to that from Asia and 
the Americas, as was also shown in a more recent study for the European Commission 
(Al-Riffai et al. 2010).  
Nevertheless, net emissions are potentially important for countries such as Mozambique 
and Tanzania. Investors interested in establishing biofuels production in Mozambique, 
for example, are often vertically integrated fuel suppliers in the EU who are looking to 
guarantee their ability to meet the EU’s fuel content mandates (Al-Riffai et al. 2010). As 
these mandates are in place largely due to environmental considerations, it is important 
to consider the net GHG impacts of biofuels production. As emphasized by Tyner et al. 
(2010), calculating the net impact of biofuels expansion is very complex both at the 
country and global level. For low income African countries, biofuels might serve as a 
catalyst for transformation of production technologies and methods, which currently   16
rely heavily upon highly extensive land use patterns and low yielding slash-and-burn 
technologies. In short, the net impacts of expanded biofuels production on land use 
change induced GHG emissions in Africa are not at all clear and depend heavily on both 
the production technologies employed and a combination of indeterminate direct and 
indirect impacts – which have to be evaluated with respect to a counterfactual scenario 
with zero or very marginal levels of biofuels production.  
Looking beyond land use change, there is some literature that assesses the implications 
of biofuels expansion on agricultural water use consumption (De Fraiture 2008; 
Varghese 2007). The results, while dependent upon the particular biofuels scenario 
chosen, show a relatively low level of impact on the global agricultural water use 
consumption, due to the fact that the largest biofuels producers rely mostly on rainfed 
feedstock production, such as for sugarcane in Brazil or palm oil production in South 
East Asia. The constraints to further irrigated area expansion might be more binding at a 
local regional level, such as the North China Plain or the groundwater dependent 
regions of South Asia, although some of these areas might actually experience less 
water stress if they were to switch out of crops like rice towards other grains that are 
likely to receive a boost in price due to increase feedstock usage for biofuels in OECD 
countries (Rosegrant et al. 2008). Given that current and projected agricultural areas in 
most of Africa will continue to be rainfed, we also feel that the implications of these 
biofuels scenarios on agricultural water use will be small relative to other 
socioeconomic impacts.  
Overall, the interactions between growth, transformation and the environment in low 
income countries, especially in Africa, is a key topic for future research with 
agricultural transformation and biofuels occupying an important share of that agenda. 
4  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we outlined an analytical framework that can guide researchers and the 
national task forces of low income countries as they assess the broader implications of 
establishing domestic biofuels industries. The framework provides a set of prioritized 
considerations and evaluation methods. Using this framework, we discussed the 
comparative socioeconomic effects of biofuels expansion on both Mozambique and 
Tanzania, and have drawn contrasts between these countries – both in terms of the 
underlying causality of simulated economywide impacts, as well as in the policy 
approaches that have been undertaken by the governments of these countries towards 
biofuels. In both cases, we have shown that there is the potential for biofuels expansion 
to provide additional growth to the national economies of these countries, and to ‘crowd 
in’ needed investments that can bring benefits to the agricultural sector as well as 
downstream processors. However, in each case, there are important tradeoffs to be 
considered when contemplating the policies to best serve the development priorities and 
future food and energy needs of these countries.  
Some of these tradeoffs stem from the opportunity costs that are implicit in diverting 
public resources towards investments in the biofuels sector (and its supporting 
infrastructure), rather than towards other potential ventures. Modelling results illustrate 
the tradeoff that exists between the competitiveness of exportable cash crops on 
international markets, as the macroeconomic effects of biofuels expansion take hold in 
the simulated scenarios. The competition for labour resources in Mozambique and the   17
implications it has for food production, for example, contrasts with the effects seen in 
Tanzania, which has a larger and more robust export crop sector and actually sees a rise 
in food production as labour is released by switching from more intensive cash crops 
towards biofuels feedstock crops. Both countries, however, need to consider what kind 
of tax incentives should be placed upon biofuel-related production activities, both in 
terms of how they compare to the support being given to other export-oriented sectors, 
as well as the overall budgetary implications for the national economy.  
Based on the two case studies, we view biofuels expansion primarily as an opportunity 
for poorer countries to spur growth and reduce poverty. However, we highlight that 
there are distributional consequences that place more of a burden on certain 
socioeconomic groups as the simulated growth in biofuels production takes place within 
each country. By and large, urban households are more vulnerable to the effects of food 
price increases than rural smallholders, so there should be some consideration given to 
the social protection of these households, even though the political economy of national 
poverty programs tend to give more weight to rural poverty alleviation. More research is 
required to understand the net impact of biofuels expansion in poor countries on 
environmental outcomes such as GHG emissions. Because biofuels production is 
potentially large relative to the existing staple and cash crop activities contained within 
the agricultural sector and overall economies of these countries, great care must be 
taken to consider the direct and indirect impacts of biofuels expansion as well as the 
trajectory of emissions in an appropriately specified counterfactual scenario. 
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